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I. INTRODUCTION
In the fight against fraud, no tool is more valuable to the federal
government than the False Claims Act (“FCA”).1 Last year, the Civil
Division for the Office of the Attorney General recovered $3.5
billion dollars in FCA recoveries.2 Of the $3.5 billion dollars in
recovered funds, the Civil Division was able to recover $1.9 billion
dollars from federal healthcare programs and another $1.9 billion
dollars from fraud related to government contracts.3 These
recoveries are important given the rampant degree at which fraud
occurs every year.
The Civil Division’s success in protecting the public coffers
cannot solely be attributed to the dedicated attorneys serving in the
Office of the United States Attorney General. Under the FCA, a
private citizen is able to file a “qui tam suit,” which allows a private
citizen, known as a “relator,” to bring a civil action against
defrauders on behalf of the federal government.4 In successful qui
tam suits, the relator is eligible to receive a portion of the money
recovered.5 Private citizens play a large part in the recovery process
as well.6 These rewards are more than a mere pittance. Last year,
relators received roughly 19.7 percent of the $2.9 billion dollars in
fraudulent payments they helped the federal government collect,
representing $597 million dollars in rewards.7 Last year also marked
the fifth year relators filed more than six hundred qui tam suits on
behalf of the federal government.8
Currently, the FCA only excludes certain categories of
individuals from serving as relators.9 Curiously enough, attorneys
are not one of them. This Note will explore the case law and ethical
rules and dilemmas associated with attorney-relators. First, this
1

Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $3.5 Billion
from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2015 (Dec. 3, 2015) (available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-35-billion-falseclaims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2015).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2016). In 2015, 423 lawsuits were filed under the qui
tam provision of the False Claims Act. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Fraud Statistics –Health and
Human Servs. (Nov. 23, 2015), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/796866/
download.
5
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1).
6
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4. In 2015, 423 lawsuits were filed under the qui
tam provision of the False Claims Act. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4.
7
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4.
8
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4.
9
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (2016).
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Note will discuss the statutory background of the False Claims Act.
Second, this Note will examine federal and state court decisions
examining whether attorneys can properly serve as relators in qui
tam suits against their former clients.10 Third, this Note will include
an overview of the ethical and evidentiary problems attorneys face
when bringing a qui tam suit against a former client and how these
requirements frustrate the government’s goal of rooting out fraud
through the FCA. Finally, this Note will conclude with a discussion
of how the American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) loyal disclosure
rules strike a healthy balance between permitting attorneys to
expose fraud while also preserving client relationships.
II. FALSE CLAIMS ACT STATUTORY BACKGROUND
A. The Beginning
The FCA prohibits individuals from making fraudulent claims
for payment against the government.11 Private citizens are
authorized to bring qui tam actions on behalf of the United States
government against defrauders.12 These suits derive their name
from the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro si ipso in hac
parte sequitur, meaning “[w]ho sues on behalf of the king as well as
for himself.”13 The FCA originated during the Civil War era.14 At
the height of fighting between the Union and Confederate soldiers,
the government faced significant problems: Union soldiers received
barrels of gunpowder that contained nothing but sawdust,
shipments of uniforms weaved from rags fell to pieces when they
came in contact with water, and contractors billed the Union for the
same mules and horses time and time again.15 The persistent abuse
led Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts to introduce the first
version of the FCA to the Senate on January 16, 1863.16

10

United States v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 734 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2013); Bury v.
Cmty. Hosps. of Cent. Cal., No. F036667, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1035 (May 8,
2002); United States ex rel. Doe v. X Corp. 862 F. Supp. 1502 (E.D. Va. 1994) (Doe III).
11
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2016).
12
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2016).
13
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1368 (9th ed. 2009).
14
James B. Helmer, False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for
Rogues, Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 1264-66 (2013).
15
Id.; James B. Helmer, Jr. & Robert Clark Neff, Jr., War Stories: A History of the Qui
Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, The 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act, and
Their Application in the United States ex rel. Gravitt v. General Electric Co. Litigation, 18
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 35, 35 (1991).
16
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 348 (1863).
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Senator Wilson decried the “bands of conspirators,” who
“plundered the treasury day after day.”17 Although the halls of the
Senate had “rung with denunciations of the frauds of contractors
upon the United States,” Senator Wilson explained the government
had no adequate law with which to punish these defrauders.18
While explaining the structure of the FCA, Senator Howard quipped,
“[i]n short, sir, I have based [the provisions of the FCA] upon the
old–fashioned idea of holding out a temptation, and ‘setting a rogue
to catch a rogue’ which is the safest and most expeditious way I have
ever discovered of bringing a rogue to justice.”19
President Lincoln signed the FCA into law on March 2, 1863.20
The statute permitted individuals to bring an action on behalf of the
United States government or themselves, against any person in the
service, or called into the service, of the United States government
who knowingly submitted false claims for payment.21 Defrauders
were forced to pay double the amount of damages sustained by the
United States as a result of the fraud, as well as a two–thousand
dollar penalty per false claim.22 As an incentive for bringing these
suits, the individual bringing the qui tam action was entitled to half
of the government’s recovery.23
B. Parasitic Problems
The FCA remained unchanged until 1943 when a rash of
“parasitic lawsuits” filed by abusers of the statute’s qui tam
provision spurred Congress into action.24 The abusers would hide
out in federal courthouses in hopes of stumbling across an
indictment of a government contractor for false claims.25 Upon
hearing the indictment, the individual would file a qui tam action,
allowing some relators to collect rewards for wrongdoing they
overheard another reporting.26

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id. at 956.
Id.
Id.
12 Stat. 696 (1863).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Helmer, supra note 14, at 1267–68.
Helmer, supra note 14, at 1267–68.
Helmer, supra note 14, at 1267–68.
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In response to abuse of the qui tam provision, the 1943
amendments to the FCA significantly changed the Civil War era
statute.27 To combat the filing of the redundant lawsuits described
above, relators were required to turn over all evidence to the
government at the time the action was filed.28 Additionally, the
revisions required courts to dismiss qui tam suits if the government
possessed knowledge of the fraud when the action was filed.29 The
government would then have sixty days to determine whether or not
it would bring the claim against the accused.30
The 1940s amendments also significantly changed the reward
structure of the FCA. Congress reduced the amount of money an
individual could receive as a bounty for bringing the action. In cases
where the government chose to pursue the case, the maximum
award was capped at ten percent.31 If the government decided not
to pursue the case, the individual was entitled to receive no more
than twenty-five percent of the award.32 The revisions did not
guarantee relators a reward, however; Congress gave the ability to
award damages to individuals solely within the discretion of the
court.33 A judge could award nothing if she deemed it appropriate.34
These changes eliminated most qui tam suits for a number of
years.35
C. The FCA Reborn
Congress took action to strengthen the FCA after a second wave
of fraudulent claims for military spending raided the public coffers
in the early 1980s.36 Organizations billed the government absurd
amounts of money for relatively inexpensive items.37 On October
27, 1986, President Reagan signed into the law the second set of
amendments to the FCA.38

27

89 Cong. Rec. 7570, 7571 (1943).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (1943).
29
Id. § 3730(d)(4).
30
Id.
31
Id. § 3730.
32
Id. § 3730(d)(1).
33
Id. § 3730(d)(3).
34
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3) (1943).
35
Helmer, supra note 14, at 1271.
36
Helmer, supra note 14, at 1271.
37
Helmer, supra note 14, at 1271–72.
38
False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat.
3153 (1986).
28
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The 1986 amendments adjusted the proportion of the recovery
a relator would receive.39 Successful relators were listed to receive
between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the recovery if the
government decided to intervene, and between twenty-five to thirty
percent of the recovery if the individual pursued the case on his
own.40 Regardless of whether the government chose to intervene,
relators retained the right to participate in the litigation.41 Congress
increased the ante for the federal government from double to treble
damages.42 The penalties associated with each false claim were
similarly increased to between five thousand and ten thousand
dollars.43 A successful relator could also recover legal expenses from
the accused.44
Furthermore, Congress enacted several protections to shield
employee relators from retaliation claims.45 The FCA provides that
employees, contractors and agents who are “discharged, demoted,
suspended, threatened, harassed or in any other manner
discriminated against” are entitled to all relief necessary to make
them whole if the aforementioned actions were in response to the
individual’s lawful acts done in adherence to the FCA.46 The
available relief could include:
. . . reinstatement with the same seniority status that employee,
contractor, or agent would have had but for the discrimination, [two]
times the amount of back pay, interest on the back pay, and
compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the
discrimination, including litigation costs and reasonable attorneys’
fees.47

The 1986 amendments also brought substantive changes to the law.
Congress clarified the necessary degree of intent required to
establish a violation under the FCA.48 The amendments also
enunciated the relator’s burden of proof for civil FCA actions.49

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) & (2) (1986).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 3729(1)(G).
Id.
Id. § 3730(c)(1).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1986).
Id. § 3730(h)(1).
Id. § 3730(h)(2).
Id. § 3729(b).
Id. § 3731(c).
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Congress attempted to remedy its de facto elimination of qui
tam suits by addressing the controversial “government knowledge”
defense from the 1943 amendments.50 The solution Congress
settled upon was the “public disclosure” exception.51 Under this
exception, a relator is barred from bringing a qui tam suit based
upon a public disclosure of the alleged wrongdoing by the media or
a criminal, administrative, or civil hearing.52 If, however, the relator
was the “original source” of the information and possessed direct
and independent knowledge of the alleged wrongdoing and
voluntarily provided the government with the information before
filing a qui tam action, the relator was permitted to pursue the
claim.53
D. Congressional Clarification
In response to decades of court decisions interpreting the
language of the 1986 amendments, Congress enacted the most
recent substantive changes to the FCA through a series of
amendments spread across three statutes: the Fraud Enforcement
and Recovery Act (“FERA”), Patient and Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”), and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Act (“Dodd–
Frank”).54
Congress was concerned that judicially imposed
qualifications and limitations “undermined” the effectiveness of the
FCA.55
Court decisions imposing these limitations allowed
“subcontractors and non-governmental entities [to] escape[]
responsibility for proven frauds.”56
FERA made significant changes to the FCA, including rejecting
the intent requirement created by the Supreme Court in Allison–
Engine v. United States ex rel. Sanders.57 In Allison–Engine, former
employees of a subcontractor filed a qui tam suit alleging the
subcontractor submitted invoices to two shipyards falsely certifying
the subcontractor had constructed a set of generators.58 The
50

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (1986).
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. § 3730(e)(4).
54
Pub. L. No. 111–21, § 4, 123 Stat. 1617, 1621–25 (2009); Pub. L. No. 111–148,
§ 10104(j)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 901–02 (2010); Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 1079A(c), 124
Stat. 1376, 2077 (2010).
55
H. R. Rep. No. 111-97, at 2 (2009); S. Rep. No. 111-10, at 10 (2009).
56
S. Rep. No. 111-10, at 10 (2009).
57
Allison-Engine v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662 (2008); S. Rep. No.
110–507, at 6 (2008).
58
Allison-Engine, 553 U.S. at 662.
51
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Supreme Court held that a subcontractor was not liable under the
FCA because claims for reimbursement were only submitted to the
general contractor and the shipyards, not the federal government.59
In the Court’s view, relators must prove defrauders intended for
their false statements to be material to the government’s decision to
pay or approve a false claim.60 Subcontractors around the country
began using the Allison–Engine decision to have FCA claims from
relators dismissed, allowing numerous frauds to be carried out upon
federal programs typically protected by the FCA.61
Congress noted that such a holding was not only inconsistent
with the legislative intent of the FCA, but also created a new defense
for subcontractors.62 Dissatisfied with the Supreme Court’s holding,
Congress amended the definition of “claim” to include a request or
demand for money or property regardless of “whether or not the
United States has title to the money or property.”63
The FERA amendments also expanded FCA liability to include
any person who makes or uses a false statement material to a false
claim.64 Additionally, the protections originally only available to
employees were expanded to include contractors, agents, or
associated others.65 Congress further stipulated that complaints
proffered by the federal government were to relate back to the
original relator’s filing date if the Government’s cause of action
arose out of the conduct or transaction of the prior relator’s
complaint.66 Changes were also made to the seal provision of the
FCA.67
The amendments to the FCA made by the ACA targeted what
Congress believed were misinterpretations of the public disclosure
bar.68 In Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v.
United States ex rel. Wilson, the Supreme Court extended the public
disclosure exception to include not only information obtained from
federal administrative hearings, audits, or investigations, but also to
state and local information sources.69 Congress disagreed with the
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id. at 671–72.
Id. at 665.
111 S. Rep. No. 111-10, at 8–9 (2009).
Id.
Id. at 19.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2) (2009).
Id. § 3730(h)(1).
Id. § 3731(c).
Id. § 3732(c).
110 S. Rep. No. 110-507, at 21-26 (2008).
Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559
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Supreme Court’s interpretation of the public disclosure exception,
and explained that only three sources of public information could
bar a qui tam suit from being tried: a federal hearing, a federal
report, or the news media.70 The government also retained the
ability to waive the dismissal of claims based upon the three types
of public disclosure.71
The changes incorporated in Dodd–Frank pertained to the
appropriate statute of limitations for retaliation suits brought by
whistleblowers.72
The Supreme Court previously ruled the
appropriate statute of limitations was to be determined by
consulting “a comparable statute in the state in which the retaliation
had occurred.”73 Congress rejected this interpretation of the statute,
and instead stated the appropriate statute of limitations for all
retaliation claims brought by whistleblowers would be three years
after the alleged retaliation occurred.74
From its very beginning, the FCA has been a powerful tool in
the fight against fraud. Congress unequivocally reversed the
limitations placed upon the provisions of the FCA in the 1940s by
the urging of the Department of Justice with its full throttled support
of the law in the 1980s. The most recent revisions to the law,
drawing bipartisan support, have shown that Congress believes the
FCA is a valuable and powerful tool for the federal government that
courts should not limit. Congress has decided to expand liability,
increase the number of scenarios in which individuals can bring
claims and also increase the award for potential relators as well. The
revisions have shown that Congress is not only comfortable with,
but fully supports the expansive private-enforcement scheme
created to combat fraud.
III. CASES OF ATTORNEY-RELATORS
In United States ex rel. Doe v. X Corp., the District Court of the
Eastern District of Virginia decided whether an attorney’s
participation in a qui tam action against the attorney’s former
employer violated state ethical rules of conduct.75 The Doe court
also squarely addressed the issue of whether it was proper for
U.S. 280, 290 (2010).
70
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(i) (2010).
71
Id. at § 3730(e)(4)(A).
72
Helmer, supra note 14, at 1280.
73
Helmer, supra note 14, at 1280.
74
31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(3) (2010).
75
Doe III, 862 F. Supp. 1502 (E.D. Va. 1994).
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attorneys to serve as relators in qui tam suits brought against former
clients.76 John Doe, in-house counsel for X Corp., became
concerned that X Corp. might be violating multiple provisions of
the Federal Acquisition Regulations.77 After reporting his suspicions
to X Corp., Doe began a thorough investigation of the perceived
wrongdoing.78
X Corp. abruptly brought Doe’s investigation to a halt, however,
by transferring Doe to another office and shifting the primary
control of the inquiry to another in-house counsel.79 Despite being
moved, Doe continued his investigation into the matter.80 After a
year, Doe expressed his dissatisfaction to other members of the X
Corp. legal team again, reiterating the potential violations of the
regulation that he believed X Corp. was perpetrating as well as
expressing dissatisfaction over the speed in which the investigation
was being completed.81 Three months later, X Corp. terminated
Doe.82 In an effort to correct the perceived wrongdoing of his
former employer, Doe took approximately 4,300 copies of
documents belonging to X Corp. that he believed supported his
allegations of fraudulent activity and filed a qui tam suit under the
FCA.83
The qui tam suit involved a number of trials.84 Eventually, X
Corp. reached a settlement with the government to clear the
corporation of liability under the FCA.85 However, Doe was not
satisfied. He demanded a reward as a relator as well as attorney’s
fees.86 X Corp. balked at the demand, arguing that Doe’s role as X
Corp.’s former in-house counsel barred him from properly serving
as a relator in the FCA claim.87 X Corp. filed a motion to dismiss

76

Id. at 1506–08.
Id. at 1504.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Doe III, 862 F. Supp. at 1504.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
See X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff’d, Under Seal v. Under
Seal, 17 F.3d 1435 (4th Cir. 1994) (Doe I); X Corp v. Doe, 816 F. Supp. 1086 (E.D. Va.
1993) (Doe II).
85
Doe III, 862 F. Supp. 1502, 1505 (E.D. Va. 1994).
86
Id. at 1505–06.
87
Id.
77

DUMNICH NOTE - MACROS FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

GOING ROGUE: ATTORNEY-RELATORS

8/23/2016 11:19 PM

477

Doe’s claims for an award and attorney’s fees, or, in the alternative,
summary judgment as a matter of law on the issue.88
The Doe court reviewed the FCA, focusing on the provisions
which expressly barred relators from bringing certain claims.89
Claims brought by attorney-relators were conspicuously absent
from this list.90 In the absence of a statutory provision to the
contrary, the District Court held attorneys could not be prohibited
from serving as a relator in an action against a former client.91
X Corp. insisted that Congress did not intend for a counsel to
serve as a relator in qui tam suits filed against former clients because
doing so would destroy the sacred relationship between attorneys
and their clients.92 Furthermore, allowing attorneys to serve as
relators would incentivize those individuals to “flout their ethical
obligations” and use the client’s confidential information for their
own personal gain.93 Clients would therefore be hesitant to seek
help from their attorneys, as any disclosure made by the client could
potentially serve as the fuel for a qui tam suit under the FCA.94
The Doe court was unimpressed by the argument, citing several
reasons for disagreeing with X Corp.’s analysis.95 First, X Corp.’s
concerns rang hollow; nothing in the FCA preempted any state
ethical obligations that an attorney owed to their client.96 Second,
the FCA did not require attorneys to file qui tam suits.97 The statute
merely made qui tam suits permissive.98 Third, the court argued the
FCA does not shield an attorney from liability from state law
claims.99 Fourth, injunctive or declaratory relief could be made
available to clients who foresaw an attorney revealing their
confidential information.100

88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Id.
Doe III, 862 F. Supp. at 1505.
Id.
Doe III, 862 F. Supp. at 1506.
Id. at 1507.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Doe III, 862 F. Supp. at 1507.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Putting the aforementioned arguments aside, the court
explained that Congress simply had not included attorneys in the
list of individuals prohibited from serving as a relator.101 Such a
prohibition was for the legislature to decide, not the courts.102
Including attorneys as relators served the legislative intent of the
FCA “to enhance the Government’s ability to recover losses
sustained as a result of fraud against the Government.”103
In Bury v. Community Hospitals of Central California, the
former general counsel for a hospital filed a qui tam suit under the
California state False Claims Act against his former employer and
the County of Fresno.104 Bury alleged the County was improperly
receiving funding for providing medical services to the indigent
because his former employer had assumed sole responsibility for
those duties under a contract and lease arrangement with the
County.105 The hospital moved to have the case dismissed, arguing
that Bury violated ethical and statutory duties of confidentiality by
pursuing his qui tam suit against a former client.106
Referencing the District Court’s decision in Doe III, the Court
of Appeal of California noted Bury’s status as a former general
counsel did not preclude the qui tam suit.107 However, the court
held Bury’s duty of loyalty and confidentiality to his former client,
the hospital, precluded his qui tam suit.108 The court explained an
attorney and client are in a fiduciary relationship “of the highest
character.”109 It is the duty of the attorney to “to maintain inviolate
the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve
the secrets, of his or her client.”110 Bury was under an obligation to
protect his client “in every possible way.”111
The District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia engaged in
a balancing of federal and state interests similar to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals’ approach in United States ex rel. Fair Lab.
101

Doe III, 862 F. Supp. at 1508.
Id.
103
Doe III, 862 F. Supp. at 1508 (quoting S. Rep. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986)).
104
No. F036667, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1035, at *2 (May 8, 2002).
105
Id. at *4.
106
Id. at *4-5.
107
Id. at *7.
108
Id. at *10-12.
109
Id. at *10 (citing Zador Corp. v. Kwan, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1285, 1293 (1995)).
110
Bury v. Cmty. Hosps. of Cent. Cal., No. F036667, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
1035, at *10 (May 8, 2002) (quoting Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (e) (2016)).
111
Id. at *11.
102
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Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc.112 Unilab Corporation,
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Quest Diagnostics, Inc. (“Quest”),
was sued under the False Claims Act by a partnership created by
three former executives.113 One of the executives was Mark Bibi, the
former general counsel of Unilab.114 The partnership alleged Unilab
and Quest violated the Federal Health Care Anti-Kickback Act, 42.
U.S.C. § 1320a– 7b(b) (“AKS”) by offering medical device testing
services to clients at low rates in order to receive a greater number
of referrals for Medicaid and Medicare patients.115
In 1996, Bibi informed executives at Unilab that this “pull
through scheme” was a potential violation of the AKS.116 In
response, Unilab raised their prices, resulting in a loss of business
to competitors.117 In 1999, Unilab hired new executives that
lowered the price of the medical device testing services to their
previous rates.118 Again, Bibi expressed his concern that the pull
through scheme was likely illegal.119 This time, however, Unilab
executives refused to consult with Bibi on any compliance issues
and eventually replaced him as general counsel.120
Prior to joining the qui tam suit, Bibi consulted the New York
Code of Professional Responsibility and the American Bar
Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct to determine if his
participation in the qui tam suit would violate any ethical
obligations.121 Bibi did not believe his participation in the FCA case
would be problematic because Unilab continued to defraud the
United States government.122 In the ensuing litigation, Quest and
Unilab disagreed with Bibi’s interpretation of the rules, arguing they
would be unduly prejudiced if the plaintiffs would be allowed to
proceed using confidential information Bibi had gained through his
relationship with the defendants.123
112

United States v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 734 F.3d 154, 157 (2d Cir. 2013).
United States ex rel. Fair Lab. Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 05
Civ. 5393, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2011).
114
Id. at *6.
115
Id. at *2.
116
Id. at *9-10.
117
Id. at *10.
118
Id.
119
United States ex rel. Fair Lab. Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 05
Civ. 5393, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2011).
120
Id. at *12-13.
121
Id. at *15-16.
122
Id. at *16.
123
Id. at *19.
113
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York explained that when state ethical rules clash with federal
interests, federal courts must interpret the rule in such a way as to
balance the varying interests between federal and state law.124 The
court noted that nothing in the FCA shielded a relator from liability
from state statutes.125 The court found that Bibi’s disclosure of
Quest’s confidential information did not meet the requirements of
the New York Code of Professional Responsibility’s “ongoing
crime” exception.126 The information that Bibi disclosed was
excessive because he not only disclosed confidential information to
the other members of FLPA, but he also disclosed information to
the government and another relator in a California qui tam suit.127
The court dismissed the complaint and prohibited Bibi and FLPA,
including any of its members, from bringing a suit against the
defendants based upon the facts of the case.128
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the dismissal.129 Much like the district court, the
Second Circuit found no language in the FCA that preempted any
state statutes; Bibi was still liable for any violation of state rules.130
The appellate court recognized, however, that state rules could run
“antithetical to federal interests,” and so the judges proceeded to
decide the appeal by balancing the relevant state and federal
interests.131
Although Bibi could have reasonably believed the defendants
were going to commit a crime via the pull through scheme, the
Second Circuit believed Bibi’s disclosure of Quest’s confidences was
beyond what was necessary to prevent the commission of a crime
within the meaning of New York Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 4–101.132 The rule prohibits attorneys from
revealing confidences or secrets of clients, using confidences or
secrets of clients to the disadvantage of clients, and using
124
Id. at *20–21 (citing Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 646 (2d Cir.
1995)).
125
United States ex rel. Fair Lab. Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 05
Civ. 5393, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2011) (citing United
States ex rel. Doe v. X. Corp., 862 F. Supp. 1502, 1507 (E.D. Va. 1994)).
126
Id. at *38.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
United States v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 734 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2013).
130
Id. at 165.
131
Id. at 163.
132
Id. at 164–65.
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confidences or secrets of clients to the advantage of a third party,
absent consent.133
Attorneys are permitted to make a disclosure, however, if they
reveal both “the intention of a client to commit a crime and the
information necessary to prevent the crime.”134 The court explained
that New York Rule 1.6(b) effectively balanced the federal interests
at stake by permitting attorneys to disclose information “necessary”
to prevent the commission of a crime.135 Bibi had many alternatives
available to him besides disclosing information to the extent at
which he did.136 The Second Circuit held that his conduct was not
protected and dismissed the suit against the defendants to prevent
any undue prejudice to Unilab or Quest Diagnostics.137
IV. EVIDENTIARY OBSTACLES & ETHICAL RULES
The Quest and Doe courts were quite adamant in their
assertions that attorneys were not categorically barred from serving
as relators in qui tam actions. Both courts noted Congress intended
the FCA to have a broad reach. The classes of individuals who could
potentially serve as relators were broad in order to assist the
government in its fight against fraud. Although nothing bars
attorneys from serving as relators, ethical and evidentiary rules make
it exceedingly difficult for attorney-relators to bring successful qui
tam claims.138
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege exists in every American
jurisdiction in some form, either by statute, evidence code, or
common law.139 The privilege protects the communications that
transpire between an attorney and a client when the client is
obtaining legal advice.140 A form of the attorney-client privilege also
exists between a corporation’s in-house counsel and corporate

133

NEW YORK CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4–101 (2013).
Id.
135
Id.; Quest, 734 F.3d at 164.
136
Quest, 734 F.3d at 164–65.
137
Id. at 167-68.
138
For a more detailed examination of the interplay between ethical and
evidentiary rules and the attorney-relator, see Kathleen M. Boozang, The New Relators:
In-House Counsel and Compliance Officers, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 16 (2012).
139
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
140
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
134
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representatives.141 In essence, the privilege gives clients and
attorneys the right to not divulge what they communicate to one
another.142 Privilege is created when a communication is made
between privileged persons in confidence for the purpose of
obtaining or providing legal services to the client.143 The protection
continues so long as the confidence is maintained.144
To invoke the attorney-client privilege as a shield an individual
must first show that a “communication” took place, defined as “any
expression through which a privileged person . . . undertakes to
convey information to another privileged person and any document
or other record revealing such an expression.”145
The
communication may be a face-to-face conversation, telephone call,
memorandum, e–mail, text message, or any other mode of
exchanging information.146 Additionally, the communication need
not even succeed to receive protection.147 The privilege only
prevents disclosure of the communication between the attorney and
client; it does not, however, protect the disclosure of the underlying
facts of the conversation.148
Second, the communication must occur between privileged
persons.149 Privileged persons include “the client [], the client’s
lawyer, agents of either who facilitate communications between
them, and agents of the lawyer who facilitate the representation.”150
Whether the client is currently represented by an attorney or is a
prospective client does not matter; the privilege will protect
communications from either type of client.151 The protection does
not extend to non-privileged persons, however.152 Thus, any
communication between a privileged person and a non-privileged
individual falls outside the purview of the privilege.153

141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 78 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
Id. § 68 cmt. d.
Id. § 68.
Id. § 79.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
Id. § 69 cmt. b.
Id. § 69 cmt. c.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.

2000).
149
150
151
152

Id. § 70.
Id.
Id. § 70 cmt. c.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

2000).
153

Id.

OF

LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
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With regard to the confidence requirement, a client must
reasonably believe that the communication is confidential before
they may assert privilege over the communication.154 However, the
Restatement notes that a client’s intention is not “determinative.”155
For example, a client may not be found to have a reasonable belief
a communication was confidential if the communication was made
in a public place.156 Additionally, the presence of a third party can
destroy the privilege whether or not the client intended for the
communication to be confidential.157
The final element an individual must show to claim the
protection of the privilege is that the communication was for the
purpose of “obtaining or providing legal services.”158 The standard
is met if a communication is made to either an attorney or a person
whom the prospective client reasonably believes is an attorney is
consulted for the purpose of obtaining legal assistance.159 The
phrase “legal assistance” includes legal counseling, but also includes
“document preparation, litigation services, or any other assistance
customarily performed by lawyers in their professional capacity.”160
Once obtained, the attorney-client privilege may be waived in
few circumstances. Clients can waive the privilege themselves by
divulging the privileged information voluntarily to a non–
privileged person.161 Clients may also waive the privilege if they put
the privileged communication into issue in a legal matter, such as a
suit for legal malpractice.162 An attorney may waive the privilege if
expressly authorized by a client, if impliedly authorized by a client,
or if the client relates information to a third party to the effect that
the attorney may waive the privilege.163 Attorneys may also waive
the privilege by failing to invoke it or to comply with a court
order.164

154
155
156
157
158
159
160

Id. § 70 cmt. f.
Id. § 70 cmt. b.
Id.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 72 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 72 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.

2000).
161
162
163
164

Id. § 79.
Id. § 80.
Id. § 78 cmt. b.
Id.
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The maxim relies upon the reasoning that accurate and just legal
advice depends upon the ability of the client to disclose information
to their attorney without fear of having their information
disclosed.165 Without the fear of disclosure, clients communicate
freely with their attorneys, which “encourages observance of the law
and aids in the administration of justice.”166 By affording the client
the protection of the attorney–client privilege, a client is more likely
to disclose all of the facts in a given circumstance, allowing the
attorney to comment and advise the client comprehensively on their
legal obligations and how a client may best comply with the law.167
Bibi’s comments that the pull–through scheme potentially
exposed Quest to liability under various federal laws could
potentially be considered privileged communications. Quest could
have raised the attorney-client privilege as a shield, barring Bibi
from disclosing information he communicated to Quest or
information communicated to Bibi from Quest in connection with
Bibi’s legal services.
Thinking about attorney-relators more
generally, the attorney-client privilege may in fact preclude some
evidence from being brought forward, perhaps a warning from an
attorney to a client that a certain action could potentially lead to
fraud. The underlying facts, however, would be most important to
any qui tam suit, and these facts lie outside the protection of the
privilege.
B. The Duty of Confidentiality
It is important to note that the duty of confidentiality cited by
the Quest court is distinct from the attorney-client privilege. The
Second Circuit decided Quest on Bibi’s failure to protect Quest’s
confidences, which violated the professional duty of confidentiality
Bibi owed his client. The protection of client-confidentiality
afforded by Rule 1.6 is much broader than the protection of the
attorney-client privilege.168 In contrast to the privilege, Rule 1.6 is
applicable in situations other than when evidence is sought from an

165
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“The privilege
recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice
or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.”).
166
Commodity Futures Trading Com’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1983)
(citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389).
167
Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality
Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 858 (1998).
168
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
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attorney under compulsion of law.169 The rule prohibits an attorney
from making a disclosure of client confidences unless the disclosure
is authorized by law or the professional rules.170 The American Bar
Association’s guidelines for confidentiality, Model Rule 1.6(a),
states a “lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent,
the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).”171
Client confidentiality covers both information related to the
representation of a client and any information that could
“reasonably lead to the discovery” of information of the client.172
Model Rule 1.6 also shields any personal information relating to the
client that the client would not want generally known.173
Information taken from interviews, documents, photographs or
other sources also fall under the umbrella of confidentiality.174
Lastly, information about the client need not be gained during the
course of the representation in order to trigger the duty; any
information the attorney gains concerning a client before the
representation begins or after the representation is terminated is
protected by the rule.175
Model Rule 1.6 also contains provisions detailing when an
attorney may permissibly reveal client confidences.176 Rule 1.6(b)
states a “lawyer may reveal information relating to the
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary” to accomplish one of seven possible
outcomes.177 Two exceptions, Rule 1.6(b)(2) and Rule 1.6(b)(3),
are most relevant to the discussion of the FCA.
With regard to Rule 1.6(b)(2), the rules state an attorney may
reveal confidential client information when she reasonably believes
it is necessary to “prevent the client from committing a crime or
fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the
financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of

169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

Id.
See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
Id. r. 1.6(a).
Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 4.
Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 2.
Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 3.
Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 20.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
Id.

DUMNICH NOTE - MACROS FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

486

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

8/23/2016 11:19 PM

[Vol. 40:2

which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services.”178 Rule
1.6(b)(2) is a forward-looking rule; here, the drafters of the Model
Rules were concerned with future frauds that would be committed.
Attorneys may only disclose information when they are reasonably
certain a substantial injury will result.179 Even if they are reasonably
certain, Rule 1.6(b)(2) further limits the attorney to disclosing
information only when the client has used the attorney’s services to
further the fraud.180
In contrast, Rule 1.6(b)(3) contemplates fraud that a client has
already committed.181 Rule 1.6(b)(3) states an attorney may reveal
confidential client information when she reasonably believes the
revelation will “prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the
financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain
to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or
fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s
services.”182
Regardless of whether the fraud in question is a past or future
fraud, the disclosure exception highlights three requirements that
must be met before a lawyer may disclose confidential information.
First, the lawyer must be reasonably certain the client’s actions will
result in substantial financial injury or substantial injury to the
property of another person.183 Second, the client must actually use
the lawyer’s services to further the fraud.184 Third, the disclosure is
only permitted to prevent a fraud from being committed or to
prevent, rectify, or mitigate the harm resulting from a previous
fraud.185
C. Former Client Confidences
An attorney’s duty to maintain client confidences does not
terminate at the end of the relationship.186 Model Rule 1.9(a)
provides that an attorney who has represented a client in a matter
shall not thereafter represent another individual in a “substantially
related matter” in which the individual’s interests are materially
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

Id. r. 1.6(b)(2).
Id.
Id.
See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
Id.
Id. r. 1.6(b)(2) & (3).
Id.
Id.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
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adverse to the former client’s interests.187 Matters are “substantially
related” if they involve the same transaction or dispute.188
Furthermore, matters may be considered “substantially related” if
there is a “substantial risk” that a client’s position in a subsequent
matter would be materially advanced because of confidential factual
information as would normally have been obtained in the prior
representation.189 This prohibition can be waived if the client gives
informed consent, confirmed in writing.190
Additionally, Rule 1.9(c) provides additional proscriptions
regarding the use of confidential information obtained from former
clients.191 Attorneys are prohibited from using information gained
during a representation to the disadvantage of a former client.192
The rule provides two exceptions. First, if the information is
generally known, the attorney may use the confidential
information.193 Second, if the attorney would otherwise be
permitted by the Model Rules to use the information, the attorney
is permitted to use the information as well.194 Additionally, Rule
1.9(c)(2) prohibits an attorney from revealing information related
to the representation of a former client, except as would otherwise
be required or permitted by the Model Rules with respect to a
client.195
D. Pleading Problems
Qui tam suits implicate fraud, so any complaint offered by a
relator must be plead with particularity.196 Relators need to
establish the “who, what, when, where and how” of the fraudulent
schemes: courts have requested information such as the dates in
which the fraudulent claims were filed, the names of individuals
who filed the fraudulent claims, the amount of money charged to
the government, and a description of the goods and services that
were billed in order for relators to keep their false claim filings
187

Id. r. 1.9(a).
Id. r. 1.9 cmt. 3.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id. r. 1.9(c).
192
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(c)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id. r. 1.9(c)(2).
196
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Gold v. Morrison-Knudsen, 68 F.3d 1475, 1477 (2d Cir.
1995); United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose–Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 228
(1st Cir. 2004).
188
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afloat.197 General outlines of fraudulent schemes, even when
provided in great detail, are by themselves insufficient to satisfy the
pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).198
The case for relators is not hopeless, however, as a number of
federal circuits have deployed relaxed pleading standards for Rule
9(b) in certain circumstances. When the evidence of fraud is
particularly in the control of the defendant, some courts have
evaluated complaints with lesser scrutiny.199 In the First Circuit,
courts have permitted relators to introduce statistical evidence to
boost their pleadings past the threshold of acceptability rather than
provide information of specific false claims.200 The Fifth Circuit has
adopted a relaxed standard in cases that contemplate a complex
fraud occurring over a large number of years, recognizing it would
be burdensome to require a relator to provide detailed information
on such a large volume of claims.201 The Ninth Circuit has similarly
relaxed the pleading requirement.202 Relators in the Fourth Circuit
need only to produce a representative sample of fraudulent claims
in order for a qui tam suit to proceed to discovery.203 The Sixth,
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits also follow a similar standard.204
E. Accounting Rule
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
includes a number of provisions regarding an attorney’s use of
197
United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield, 472 F.3d 702,
727 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 1997) & Koch v. Koch Indus., 203 F.3d
1202, 1236 (10th Cir. 2000)); United States ex rel. Polansky v. Pfizer, No. 04–cv–0704,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43438, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2009).
198
United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1311 (11th Cir.
2002); see also United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose–Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d
220, 225 (1st Cir. 2004).
199
See Wexner v. First Manhattan Co., 902 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1990).
200
United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 29 (1st
Cir. 2009).
201
United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009).
202
Ebeid v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We join the Fifth
Circuit in concluding, in accord with general pleading requirements under Rule 9(b),
that it is sufficient to allege ‘particular details of a scheme to submit false claims paired
with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims were actually
submitted.’”).
203
United States ex rel. Noah Nathan v. Takeda Pharms. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451,
455–56 (4th Cir. 2013).
204
United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 510 (6th
Cir. 2007); United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 557 (8th
Cir. 2006); United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 1301,
1308, 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).
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confidential client information.205 One unique provision contained
in the Restatement includes Section 60(2), which states “except as
stated in [section] 62, a lawyer who uses confidential information
of a client for the lawyer’s pecuniary gain other than in the practice
of law must account to the client for any profits made.”206 The rule
is primarily concerned with situations where a lawyer may unjustly
enrich himself due to information he possesses about his client.207
Unlike the other rules pertaining to the attorney’s use of the client’s
confidential information contained in the Restatement, the lawyer
is prohibited from using confidential information of the client even
if the use of such information would not risk prejudice to the
client.208 Borrowing rules from the Restatement (Second) of Agency,
the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers states that in
situations where a lawyer has personally enriched himself from the
impermissible use of confidential client information, the only
proper remedy for the client is “restitutionary relief in the form of
disgorgement of profit.”209
A lawyer may escape the clutches of the accounting language of
section 60(2) in two circumstances. First, the lawyer may
permissibly use confidential client information for the lawyer’s
personal gain if the client consents to the use of the information.210
Second, a lawyer may use confidential client information from one
client to assist in the representation of another client, so long as the
result of such information sharing does not result in a material risk
of harm to the original client.211 Such use is permitted even though
it could result in a personal gain for the lawyer himself.212
Although the Restatement does not reflect binding law, a single
state, Louisiana, has drawn parallels between the language in the
Restatement and its own mandatary law.213 An attorney who uses
confidential client information for his own benefit may be liable as
205
See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 60–69 (AM.
LAW INST. 2016).
206
Id. § 60(2).
207
Id. § 60(2) cmt. j.
208
Id.
209
Id. § 60(2) cmt. j.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.
1958).
210
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60(2) cmt. j (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60(2), with LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 3004, 3005 cmt. b (1997).
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a fiduciary for a claim of misappropriation of confidential
information.214 Furthermore, the Louisiana Civil Code provides
that mandataries owe their principals everything they received by
virtue of the mandate.215 This rule applies to anything unduly gained
by the mandatary as well.216
F. Summary
Evidentiary rules and ethical requirements make life difficult for
an attorney-relator. All relators, attorney or not, must plead their
causes of action with sufficient particularity in order to survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. Such a rule necessarily raises the
difficulty of successfully pleading a complaint. Particularity
becomes even more of a problem for the would-be attorney-relator,
however, because the relator is prohibited from using a number of
different sources of information due to either evidentiary or ethical
rules.
In trying to plead a complaint with particularity, the attorney
must make sure not to base her claim on any communication that
took place between the attorney and client for the provision of legal
services, as the attorney-client privilege would protect these
communications. Additionally, any information gained during the
course of the representation that either relates to the representation
or could potentially lead to the discovery of information that relates
to the representation, is also barred from disclosure by Rule 1.6.
Unless otherwise permitted by the Model Rules, the attorney would
also be prohibited from using information gained during the course
of the representation to the disadvantage of a former client or
revealing that information to others.
Assuming an attorney was able to craft a complaint with
particularity that did not rely upon any communication for the
provision of legal services or any information gained during the
course of the representation or could lead to the discovery of
information related to the representation, a qui tam suit would be
able to move forward. However, in some jurisdictions, the
attorney’s use of client information to personally enrich himself
may be considered a violation of the attorney’s fiduciary duty to his
client. Even if the qui tam suit were successful, the attorney would

214
Defcon, Inc. v. Webb, 687 So. 2d 639, 643 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Woodward v.
Steed, 680 So. 2d 1320, 1326 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
215
LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 3004 (2015).
216
Id.
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need to account back to his client any money he gained from a qui
tam suit.
The Quest, Bury, and Doe III courts mentioned that attorneys
were included in the class of persons eligible to serve as relators in
qui tam suits. The analysis above, however, demonstrates just how
difficult serving as an attorney-relator can be. A more workable
solution may be to advocate for changes to state ethical rules to
allow for attorneys to disclose acts of fraud occurring within an
attorney’s organization. As the next section will detail, “loyal
disclosure rules” are particularly suited to cure the current
inconsistency between protecting the public coffers and the
relationship between an attorney and his client.217
V. LOYAL DISCLOSURE RULES – AN APPROPRIATE MIDDLE–GROUND
Loyal disclosure rules are designed to permit attorneys, in
certain circumstances, to reveal confidential information of their
client, an organization.218 The action is based in the belief that the
disclosure is necessary to protect the organization from the harmful
conduct of one of its members.219 Disclosure is justified because it
is in the interest of the client, the organization.220
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) first
discussed loyal disclosure rules in response to the major financial
scandals.221 The ABA has debated its own rules regarding
confidentiality throughout the past century.222 In 1983, the ABA
adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.223 These rules
affirmed the ABA’s stance of protecting client confidentiality.224

217
George C. Harris, Taking the Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liability for Failure to
Prevent Harm to Organizational Clients Through Disclosure of Constituent Wrongdoing, 11
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 597, 599 (1998). A “loyal disclosure” is defined as “[a]
disclosure . . . justified not despite loyalty to the client but because it is in the client’s
interest.” Id.
218
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
219
Id.
220
Harris, supra note 217, at 599.
221
Paula Schaefer, Overcoming Noneconomic Barriers to Loyal Disclosure, 44 AM. BUS.
L.J. 417, 429–30 (2007).
222
Id.
223
American Bar Association, Center for Professional Responsibility, Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/
publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2016).
224
American Bar Association adopted confidentiality rules that stated that an
attorney may only disclose confidential information of a client to protect a third party
from “imminent death or substantial bodily harm.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
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In the wake of a number of highly publicized corporate
scandals, the ABA created the Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility.225 The purpose of the task force was to evaluate the
legal and ethical considerations present in the corporate context.226
In the face of such widespread failures by a number of large
corporate entities, the ABA wished to make recommendations to
attorneys, business officers, and regulators on how to best handle
issues of corporate governance.227
The testimony largely emphasized that when an individual
engages in conduct that injures an organization, attorneys owe a
duty to their organization not to the organization members.228 The
Task Force rejected the idea that organizations would keep their inhouse counsel at arm’s length for fear of reporting if the proposed
rules were adopted.229 Organizational clients present a unique
concern: the attorney may be forced to disclose information in order
to prevent substantial injury to an organization based upon a
constituent’s actions.230 The end result was the adoption of Rule
1.13.231
A. State Loyal Disclosure Statutes
Twenty-eight states have adopted organizational client rules
similar to the 2003 proposed amendments.232 In general, the rule
charges lawyers with proceeding with whatever is reasonably

225
Final Report, ABA Presidential Task Force on Corporate Responsibility (August
11-12, 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/
final_report.pdf.
226
Schaefer, supra note 221, at 429.
227
Schaefer, supra note 221, at 429–30.
228
Final Report, supra note 225, at 12.
229
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility and
the 2003 Changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 35, 48 (2003).
230
Schaefer, supra note 221, at 430.
231
Schaefer, supra note 221, at 430-31.
232
ALASKA R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2009); ARIZ. R.P.C. r. 1.13 (2004); ARK. R.P.C. r.
1.13(c) (2016); COLO. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2007); CONN. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2016); GA.
R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2001); HAW. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2014); IDAHO R.P.C. r. 1.13(c)
(2004); IL. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2010); IND. R.P.C. r. 1.13 (2005); IOWA R.P.C. r.
32:1.13(c) (2013); KY. S.C.R. 3.130(1.13) (2009); LA. ST. Bar Ass’n. Art. XVI § 1.13(c)
(2016); MASS. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2013); NEB. CT. R.P.C. § 3-501.1.13(c) (2008); NEV.
R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2007); N.H. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2008); N.M. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2008);
N.D. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2006); OK. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2007); OR. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c)
(2015); R.I. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (DATE); S.C. R.P.C. R. 1.13(c) (2015); UTAH R., R.P.C. r.
1.13(c) (2013); VT. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2009); WASH. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2006); W. VA.
R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2015); WY. R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2014).
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necessary to protect the organization.233 When a lawyer knows that
a member of the organization is “engaged in action, intends to act
or refuses to act in a matter” that violates a legal obligation the
member owes to the organization or will result in a legal violation
that “could reasonably be imputed to the organization,” the loyal
disclosure rule is implicated.234 In these circumstances, that lawyer
is required to act as is reasonably necessary to protect the best
interests of the organization.235 Rule 1.13(b) requires the lawyer to
report the matter to a higher authority unless the lawyer reasonably
believes it is not in the best interest of the organization.236 If the
highest authority of the organization fails to remedy the situation,
and the attorney reasonably believes the legal violation is
reasonably certain to occur and will result in substantial injury to
the organization, the attorney may disclose information regardless
of whether Rule 1.6 would prohibit the disclosure.237
Three states adopted loyal disclosure rules that are similar to the
proposal that the ABA House of Delegates rejected in 1980.238 The
basic structure of these loyal disclosure rules is similar to Rule 113.
Under these rules, loyal disclosures to individuals outside of the
organization are only permitted when an attorney reasonably
believes the organization’s highest authority has acted to further the
personal or financial interests of members of that authority “which
are in conflict with the interest of the organization,” and that the
disclosure is necessary in the best interest of the organization.”239
Another variation in state loyal disclosure rules is the specific
conduct recommended to attorneys by the rule. Using the New
Jersey rule as an example, attorneys are advised to take a more global
approach to problem solving when confronted with potential legal
violations; lawyers are asked to consider the severity of the violation,
the motivations of the involved parties, the consequences to the
organization, and a host of other factors essential to making an
informed decision.240 The attorney has a duty to minimize both
disruption to the organization and the risk that confidential
233

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003).
Id.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id. r. 1.13(c)(1) & (2).
238
MD. LAWYER’S R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2016); M.R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (2016); N.J. R.P.C. r.
1.13(c) (1994).
239
MD. LAWYER’S R.P.C. r. 1.13(c) (1) & (2); M.R.P.C. r. 1.13(c)(1) & (2); N.J. R.P.C.
r. 1.13(c)(1) & (2).
240
N.J. R.P.C. r. 1.13(b).
234

DUMNICH NOTE - MACROS FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

494

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

8/23/2016 11:19 PM

[Vol. 40:2

information will be revealed.241 A number of actions that are
available to attorneys are enumerated in the rule itself. Counsel
could ask management to reconsider the matter.242 An attorney
could also obtain the opinion of an outside counsel.243 Although it
may be difficult, in-house counsel could also choose to report the
matter to a higher authority if they do not find a receptive ear from
lower level management.244
B. Adoption of Loyal Disclosure Rules
i. Removing Rewards for Rogues: Providing an Ethical Out
Widespread adoptions of loyal disclosure rules would provide
an attorney with an alternative vehicle to the FCA to prevent and
stop fraud from occurring at her organization. One of the most
important changes this would bring is the removal of money as a
motivation for action. It is important to remember the FCA’s
genesis was the idea of using a “rogue to catch a rogue.” Quest
Diagnostics stated dissatisfaction with Bibi for disclosing
confidential information he acquired during the course of their
relationship for his own personal gain.245
In the context of the rules discussed previously, widespread
adoption of Rule 1.13 would fix any problems with the Restatement
§ 60(2) or La. Civ. Code art. 3004. These rules only contemplate
situations where an attorney personally enriches himself by using
client information. Rule 1.13 does not provide any sort of award;
the disclosure is made as a matter of ethics, not as a legal claim.
Without any potential qui tam reward for serving as a relator, the
whole question of whether an accounting is owed becomes
irrelevant.
ii. Confidentiality Conundrum: Rules 1.6 and 1.9
In addition to removing financial incentives for attorneys, the
widespread adoption of Rule 1.13 presents a solution to
maneuvering around the broad confidentiality restrictions of Rule
1.6 and 1.9. As discussed previously, the amount of information
protected by the duty of confidentiality is broad. Much of the
241

Id.
Id. r. 1.13(b)(1).
243
Id. r. 1.13(b)(2).
244
Id. r. 1.13(b)(3).
245
United States ex rel. Fair Lab. Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 05
Civ. 5393, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2011).
242
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information an attorney would use for a qui tam suit would be
information related to the representation of the organization or
information that could lead to confidential information of the
organization. The exceptions to Rule 1.6 currently do not provide
attorneys with a workable solution either; the requirement that the
organization’s agent uses the attorney’s services to further the fraud
severely limits the number of scenarios in which an attorney could
disclose the information.
Rule 1.13(c)(2) provides a better framework for dealing with
the fraudulent activity of an organizational client. First, the rule
permits disclosure regardless of whether Rule 1.6(b) would permit
disclosure.246 This language is key in removing the “attorney’s
services” hurdle. Second, Rule 1.13(c)(2) is also narrow enough in
scope that attorneys will not engage in fishing expeditions to root
out fraud. The rule limits disclosures to those situations where the
attorney reasonably believes a substantial injury to the organization
is reasonably certain to occur.247 Additionally, disclosure is
permitted only to the extent an attorney reasonably believes it is
necessary to prevent injury to the organization.248 With regard to
Rule 1.9, the loyal disclosure rules do not provide much help.
Although attorneys are permitted to both use information to the
disadvantage of a former client and reveal information related to the
representation when the use of the information would “otherwise
be permitted by the rules,” the disclosure provisions of Rule 1.13
only apply to attorneys employed or retained by an organization.
iii. Privilege and Particularity
Rule 1.13 provides a solution to the particularity pleading
problem by giving attorneys a way of avoiding the issue altogether.
Loyal disclosure rules are an ethical obligation and not a cause of
action. Therefore, attorneys are not required to submit a complaint
to utilize them, nor are they required to provide a description of the
fraudulent scheme in excruciating detail. In fact, Rule 1.13 places a
duty upon attorneys to minimize the amount of confidential
information that is disclosed. Such a provision effectively balances
the confidentiality of the organization with the government’s
interest in detecting and preventing fraud.

246
247
248

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
Id. r. 1.6(b)(2).
Id.
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In contrast, privilege creates a more difficult problem.
Although Rule 1.13 may permit disclosure if the requirements are
met, the client would still retain the right to invoke the attorney–
client privilege during any resulting proceeding. By raising the
privilege as a shield, the organization would bar any
communication between the organization’s constituents and the
attorney for the provision of legal services from coming into
evidence. Unlike the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b), the
attorney–client privilege seems to be an immovable obstacle.
One important distinction between the attorney–client
privilege and the other ethical and evidentiary rules discussed in this
Note is the amount of information protected by the privilege. The
attorney–client privilege may be strong, but it covers such a tiny
amount of behavior that it hardly seems a qui tam suit would fail
by the exclusion of that evidence alone. Model Rule 113(b) requires
that a substantial injury to the organization be “likely” before an
attorney is permitted to act.249 A single communication for the
provision of legal services may prove to be insufficient for the
attorney to believe an injury is “likely.” Additionally, the attorney–
client privilege only protects the communication that took place
between the attorney and client. The underlying facts relevant to
that communication, facts that would most likely serve as evidence
of fraud, would be fair game.
iv. Solitary Snag: The Problem of Individuals
The ethical mandate of Rule 1.13 provides attorney-relators
who formerly represent organizational clients such as those
discussed in Quest and Doe with the ability to take corrective action
against fraud without relying upon the FCA. However, as the
organization in question grows smaller, and the former client
becomes less of a large corporation and more of an individual
person, Rule 1.13 becomes less applicable.
The comments to Rule 1.13 state that an “organization” is a
legal entity that is incapable of taking action on its own. 250 Instead,
officers, directors, employees, shareholders, other constituents, or
their equivalents act on behalf of the organization.251
Unincorporated associations are also included under the purview of

249
250
251

Id. r. 1.13(b).
Id. r. 1.13 cmt. 1.
Id.
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the rule.252 The language of the Rule itself considers a situation
where a helpless legal entity has been hijacked by malfeasant
managers looking to raid the federal treasury through some sketchy
business practices. In these situations, the attorney would feel
comfortable stepping in; after all, the attorney is actually saving a
client (the organization) from an individual who is supposed to be
acting on the client’s behalf. The advantage to Rule 1.13, as this
hypothetical demonstrates, is the wrongdoer is not viewed as an
individual whom the attorney owes ethical duties.
The rule analysis becomes trickier as the organization shrinks,
however. Consider the closely held corporation. While there may
technically be a legal distinction between the corporation and its
owner, in reality, there is no distinction at all. For all intents and
purposes, the corporation is the manager. In these circumstances,
disclosure of wrongdoing under Rule 1.13 for the closely held
corporation could lead to nonsensical results.
For example, consider a scenario where an attorney serving as
counsel for a corporation, wholly owned by a single individual,
finds the owner of said corporation is falsely billing the government.
Under Rule 1.13(b), the attorney would have an obligation to report
this wrongdoing to the shareholders of the corporation; in this case,
the wrongdoer himself. If the attorney, recognizing the futility in
reporting the fraudulent conduct to the “shareholder,” were to
report “up and out” of the corporation and make a disclosure to the
relevant enforcement authority, penalties would be levied against
wrongdoer: the organization/shareholder.
Rule 1.13 is completely unavailable to attorney-relators in qui
tam suits where the former client is an individual: no “organization”
exists to trigger the application of the loyal disclosure rule. For these
situations, Congress would be well–advised to prohibit attorneys
from bringing qui tam actions against individuals they formerly
represented. Although attorney-relators could chance navigating
the maze of ethical and evidentiary rules discussed earlier, it may be
in the best interest of the reputation of the legal profession to
prohibit attorneys from trying to profit at the detriment of their
former client by filing a suit under the FCA.

252

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003).

DUMNICH NOTE - MACROS FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

498

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

8/23/2016 11:19 PM

[Vol. 40:2

VI. CONCLUSION
The FCA remains one of the federal government’s most effective
tools in the fight against fraud. Relators have been crucial to the
statute’s success. By allowing private citizens of to file qui tam suits,
the government has greatly increased its ability to root out and
remedy fraud. Naturally, the greater the number of people that can
serve as relators, the greater the amount of fraud the government
will be able to detect. Limitations on who can serve as a relator
therefore undermines the government’s important interest in
fighting fraud. This Note has considered one type of relator, the
attorney-relator, and how numerous ethical and evidentiary
considerations effectively prohibit attorneys from filing qui tam
suits against former clients. The widespread adoption of loyal
disclosure rules would provide a number of key solutions to the
problems faced by organizations and attorney-relators. Loyal
disclosure rules are motivated by an ethical obligation, and not the
promise of reward. By removing money from the equation, the
attorney is immunized from any accounting claims brought by their
former clients. Making disclosure an ethical duty also allows the
attorney to prevent fraud without necessarily bringing a cause of
action against a client. Because the problems an attorney faces with
regard to the particularity requirement are obviated once the matter
is taken out of the context of a civil action, this is a key advantage.
The most important advantage gained by loyal disclosure rules,
however, is the ability to bypass the stringent confidentiality
requirements of Rule 1.6. These requirements proved to be fatal to
attorney-relators. The confidentiality rules block the greatest
amount of client information and are laced with a number of
specific requirements that effectively tie the hands of attorneyrelators. Rule 1.13 permits attorneys to disclose confidential
information despite being prohibited by Rule 1.6. Rule 1.13
provides attorneys with a number of options when the attorney
finds a member of the organization is violating a legal duty. These
options help attorneys protect their clients as well as help the
government combat fraud.

